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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the determinants of willingness to pay (WTP) for the 
environment, employing micro data from the European Value Survey (EVS) over 2008-2010 in 27 
European countries. Using ordered logit, logit and partially constrained generalized ordered logit 
models, we explore a wide set of individual and country level determinants. Our particular focus is 
on whether WTP is influenced by the Environmental Fiscal Reforms (EFR), carried out only in some 
countries of our sample. Our results show that WTP for the environment is lower in countries 
where an Environmental Fiscal Reform has been introduced. Moreover, analyses conducted on the 
role of information highlight that being presumably aware of the environmental fiscal reform does 
not affect positively the marginal willingness to pay for the environment.  
 
 
JEL codes: R220, Z130, H23 
Keywords: Willingness to pay, environment, environmental fiscal reform 
 
1.Introduction  
 
Several studies empirically investigated the factors affecting the willingness to pay (WTP) for the 
environment. While this approach has several limitation (i.e. there may exist a remarkable gap 
between the declared WTP and actual behaviour), it shows that beyond individual socio economic 
characteristics, personal beliefs and political orientation, as well as features of the context of 
residence play a significant role in influencing attitudes revealed by the citizens.   
More in detail, analyses have been conducted focusing on regional differences (Torgler and 
Garcia-Valiñas, 2007; Witzke and Urfei, 2001) or showing comparison between high income and 
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low income countries (Dorsch 2011; Franzen and Meyer 2010; Duroy 2005; Israel and Levinson 
2004; Inglehart 1995).  
This paper contributes to this literature by carrying out a European level analysis, focusing on the 
role of governments’ fiscal policies in influencing individual WTP for the environment. In particular, 
we empirically analyze preferences expressed by the citizens of 27 European countries and verify if 
they can be possibly affected by the existence of fiscal arrangements set out by a national explicit 
Environmental Fiscal Reform (EFR).  
The EFR consists in a number of integrated interventions (i.e. taxes, subsidies, incentives) carried 
out in some European countries in order to discourage polluting activities and achieve, jointly, 
economic and employment objectives. A central point of the reform is represented by the “tax 
shift” from distortive taxes to environmental ones, generating the so called “double dividend”. 
Empirical studies have taken into account the effects of EFR on competitiveness (Enevoldesen et al. 
2009; Barker et al. 2007, 2009), on equity (Barker and Kohler, 1998) and have studied its social 
acceptance (Clinch et al. 2006a, 2006b; Dresner et al. 2006), but, as far as we are currently aware, 
there are not studies analyzing the role of EFR in influencing WTP for the environment. 
Nevertheless, for its characteristics, aims and effects it seems reasonable to suppose that 
individuals’ WTP for the environment might be affected by the existence of fiscal arrangements 
set out by an EFR.  
In order to test it, we analyze micro data provided by the 2008-2010 wave of the European Values 
Survey (EVS), where people are asked about their own willingness to give part of their income in 
order to prevent environmental pollution. Following the main literature, we control for a wide 
number of individual level and country level determinants of the revealed WTP. Analyses are 
carried out by means of standard ordered logit model, while robustness checks include logit 
models and the partially constrained generalized ordered logit model. 
Our results highlight a strong negative effect of EFR on individuals’ WTP for the environment and 
show that being aware of the existence of the EFR does not impact positively on the WTP. 
Summarizing, the original contribution of this paper consists of two main elements: the 
investigation of the EFR as a determinant of WTP for the environment using European data and 
the employment of the partial generalized ordered logit model to better investigate if the effect of 
the independent variables vary by the level of the dependent variable, violating the parallel lines 
assumption. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the existing 
literature on the issue of individual WTP for the environment.  Section 3 gives a detailed definition 
of EFR and illustrates its contents in the countries where it has been set out. Section 4 presents 
the data we use in our empirical analysis, while Section 5 illustrates the methodology we applied. 
Our results are shown in Sections 6 and 7, while Sections 8 and 9 are dedicated to discussion and 
final remarks.  
 
2. Determinants of the individual WTP for the environment: the existing 
literature 
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A broad literature focused on the determinants that affect the willingness to pay for the 
environment, exploring the environmental attitude or the applicability of market based 
instruments for internalizing negative externalities.  
Although its remarkable interest, this approach presents several limitations, related to the 
sociological issues that the well known literature on the contingent valuation has largely set out 
(i.e. there may exist a gap between the declared WTP and actual behaviour), but also to the 
aspects of the question itself, that being related to the marginal willingness to pay for the 
environment in general, may reduce the real concern for the environment (Witzke and Urfei 2001; 
Togler and Garcia-Valiñas 2007), as there is not the perception of a concrete and tangible problem.  
The literature using survey data investigates the determinants of WTP for the environment at 
single country level, focusing on regional differences (Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas 2007; Witzke and 
Urfei, 2001) or shows comparison between high income and low income countries (Dorsch 2011; 
Franzen and Meyer 2010; Duroy 2005; Israel and Levinson, 2004; Inglehart 1995). 
Generally the independent variables taken into consideration can be divided into: individual (i.e. 
socio-economic conditions, political and social values) and country variables.  
Not surprisingly what affects significantly the WTP is the income variable. In a cross national 
analysis Franzen and Meyer (2010) find the confirmation of “prosperity assumption”, stating that 
environmental quality increases with income and that public environmental concern, measured by 
an additive index including the WTP for taxes or higher price to protect the environment, depends 
predominately on individual characteristics, rather than macro context. Auci et al. (2006), 
following the Kuznetz curve hypothesis, demonstrate that the WTP increases at higher levels of 
income. They explain this phenomenon as a pure income driven effect and not because of the link 
between income and other certain values of a country. Analyzing the specific case of low-income 
countries, Israel and Levinson (2004) find no strong evidence that people's WTP increases with 
per-capita GDP.  
Gender and education also affect the WTP for environmental protection (Franzen and Meyer 
2010; Torgler et al. 2008). Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas (2007) find that women are more willing to 
pay as they show a stronger preference towards the environment. In Pirani and Secondi (2010) 
this trend is confirmed: higher level of eco-friendly behavior is found among women, adult and 
elderly couples, and people with a high socio-economic status. Duroy (2005), among others, find 
that WTP for the environment and attitude in protecting the environment is a function of the level 
of education. 
Variables related to politics are found to have strong impact on environmental attitude and WTP. 
This effect has been measured using several proxies, such as political interest – discussing politics, 
interest in politics and political orientation (Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas 2006, 2007); political 
affinity -numbers of voters of green parties- (Kollmann et al. 2012); political ideology and party 
identiﬁcation (Konisky et al. 2008; Witzke and Urfei 2001). In all the cases they significantly affect 
the WTP for environmental protection. 
The variable trust is used in order to estimate the role of social capital in affecting WTP (Torgler  
and Garcia-Valiñas 2007; Dorsh 2011) and in understanding attitudes about government 
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intervention to protect the environment (Koniski et al. 2008). Religion is included as a significant 
proxy for civic values (Greeley 1993), while among the individual values the sense of belonging to 
a certain community (global/local) is also investigated. Auci et al. (2006) find that the sense of 
belonging to a wider regional group, national pride and individual blame on tax evasion are 
strongly positively correlated with the WTP for the environment.  Dorsh (2011) states that people 
who view themselves as world citizens have more WTP for the environment than others.  
As context variables, several studies includes in their models variables related to the status of the 
environment (Franzen and Meyer 2010, Kollman et al. 2012). Witzke and Urfei (2001) in a regional 
analysis find that noise from cars and litter in the neighborhood increases individuals’ WTP;  Dorsh 
(2011) in analyzing the WTP in developing countries finds out that the perception of global 
warming - loss of plant/animal biodiversity, pollution of lakes and oceans, and greenhouse effect 
has a positive impact on individuals’ MWTP, but not the local ones, expressed by poor water 
quality, poor air quality, poor sewage and sanitation.  
Following the main literature on this subject, in our analysis we will employ a wide number of 
individual level and country level determinants of the revealed WTP, adding some reflections in 
particular on the role of EFR carried out in Europe. 
 
3. Brief overview on the environmental fiscal reform 
The Environmental Fiscal Reform (EFR)
1
 encompasses a number of measures – taxes, subsidies, 
investments, incentives- aimed at combining the reduction of environmental degradation with 
political economy’ objectives (EEA 2011a, 2011b).   
Since the nineties an explicit EFR has been employed by Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany, The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Andersen and Ekins 2009). A crucial aspect of the reform is 
the tax shifting from “goods” (labour or capital) to “bads” (pollution, resource depletion) (Ashiabor 
et al. 2005; Bosquet 2000; EEA 2011a; Ekins et al. 2011). Based on “revenue recycling” and 
“budget neutrality” (WMBG, 1995 in O’ Riordan 1997), it consists in offsetting the introduction or 
the increase of environmental related taxes, by reducing distortionary taxes and generating the so 
called “double dividend”
2
 (Andersen et al. 2011; Ceriani, Franco 2011; EEA 2011a; EEA 2011b): 
“the cleaner environment is the first dividend while the increase in employment or GDP is the 
second dividend” (Clinch et al. 2006, p. 961).  
Environmental taxes are mainly set up to reduce greenhouse gases emissions and to sustainably 
manage resources. Taxes on energy, CO2 direct taxes and transport taxes, related to the 
ownership and use of vehicles are some examples, as well as taxes on NOx and SO2 and on the 
                                                           
1
 Environmental fiscal reform, ecological tax reform, green tax reform, green tax swap, green tax shifting, 
environmental tax reform are used as synonymous by a large part of the literature (Bosquet  2000). However as in 
Clinch at al. (2006b) is stated, a distinction between environmental tax reform and environmental fiscal reform is 
made, meaning by the former, the reform implemented using exclusively environmental related taxes, without other 
measures. 
2
 The double dividend hypothesis has always been highly debated (Carraro et al. 1996, Pezzey and Park 1998, Bosello 
et al. 2001). 
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management of water (taxes on ground water) and waste (landfill tax) (Eurostat 2010)
3
, (fig.1).  
The difference between simple environmental taxes and environmental taxes as part of a fiscal 
reform is the revenue recycling system. Revenues can be allocated in advance to finance specific 
environmental programmes (e.g., environmental funds, environmental projects, R&D activities) or 
can be used to compensate some of those most affected by the tax (Dresner et al. 2006). However 
the nature of the so called “tax shift” is conditioned by the main aim of the reform, which can 
differ from country to country. Examples are: the reduction of personal income taxes in Sweden; 
the reduction of the general tax revenues in Finland; the improvement of environmental 
protection and the achievement of employment’ objectives in Germany (Speck et al. 2011, in Ekins 
and Speck 2011). In practice then, depending on the aim of the reform, the shift will take place 
between environmental taxes and Personal Income tax (PIT), Social security contribution (SSC) or 
corporation taxes (tab. 1).   
At European level three main instruments have fostered the use of market-based tools: the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme, the energy taxation directive (Directive 2003/96/EC) and the 
Eurovignette directive (Directive 1999/62/EC, revised by the Directive 2006/38/EC) (Eurostat 2010). 
So far, all the European Union Member States have introduced environmental taxes, but not full 
ETR strategies
4
 (Bassi et al. 2009), with the exception of Estonia (2005) and Czech republic (2008), 
that recently have implemented the shift from conventional taxes on labour to environmental 
ones (Speeck et al. 2011, in Ekins and Speck 2011).  
The effects of the EFR have been analyzed from different points of view. Discretionary analysis 
between EFR and non EFR regions has been conducted in order to verify the effects on 
competitiveness (Enevoldesen et al. 2009; Barker et al. 2007, 2009), while the households’ 
perspective has been mainly analyzed considering the distributional effects of environmental taxes 
and related measures
5
 (Barker and Kohler 1998; Speck 1999; Klok et al. 2006; Leicester 2006; Ekins 
et al. 2011). For its characteristics, aims and effects, then, it seems reasonable to suppose that EFR 
might affect the individual’ preferences in terms of willingness to pay for the environment but, as 
                                                           
3
 In 2007, in most European countries for which data were available, households were the sector paying the most of 
total energy and transport taxes (Eurostat 2010). 
4
 The implementation of the reform depends on several factors, such as macroeconomic and labour market conditions 
(Clinch et al. 2006a). Despite “experience shows that ETR is a potential policy tool for all EU” (Speck et al. 2011, in 
Ekins and Speck 2011) and studies highlight the positive impacts on economic growth and innovation and on reduction 
of emissions (Baranzini et al. 2000, EEA 2011a), there are several difficulties of its implementation, related mainly to 
social and political conditions and the design of a proper revenue recycling system (Ashiabor et al 2005), as well as 
complementary measures for acceptance and equity (Clinch et al., 2006a, 2006b). 
5
 “The distributional effects that need to be considered in relation to ETR have various facets: 1) those due to the 
environmental taxes themselves; 2) those due to any tax reductions or revenue distribution associated with the ETR; 
3) those that arise from the broader, economic and environmental impacts of ETR, including price changes of goods 
and services and macroeconomic effects such as impacts on employment levels; 4) those due to exemptions and other 
specific provisions that may have been made in the tax design for various purposes (e.g. competitiveness, social 
concerns or environmental considerations); 5) the distribution of the environmental improvements brought about by 
the ETR”(Ekins. et al. 2011, p.2473). 
According g to EEA (2011a) the main outcomes on income distribution of environmental taxes are: 
-Motor fuel taxes tend to put the highest relative burden on middle-income groups; 
-Energy and carbon taxes tend to be weakly regressive in some countries and more strongly regressive in others 
(notably the United Kingdom); 
-Rural households tend to be disproportionately burdened by environment-related taxes, especially motor fuel taxes. 
6 
 
far as we are aware, no previous studies have analyzed the role of EFR in influencing WTP for the 
environment. By means of the orderd logit model we will try to test what the role of EFR on WTP 
for the environment is. In particular our hypothesis is, based on the assumption that in countries 
in which an explicit EFR has been implemented for years, the marginal WTP for the environment 
might be lower than in countries where this system has not been introduced.  
 
 
4. Data and descriptive analysis 
Our empirical analysis is based on individual data drawn from the 2008-2010 wave of the 
European Value Survey database (EVS 2011). EVS represents “the most comprehensive research 
project on human values in Europe”
6
. It is based on interviews to representative samples of 
population in the European countries and collects data about the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the interviewees together with information about their personal beliefs, cultural tendencies and 
ideas about political, religious, and economic issues. 
We selected data from 27 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, the latter being formed by the data collected England plus the ones 
from Northern Ireland. As already discussed in section 3, six among them carried out an explicit 
EFR before 2008 (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK). 
We measure the individual WTP for the environment through the answer given to the question: “I 
would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent 
environmental pollution” (ENVIRONMENTAL).  
Given that the question asks about the WTP for preventing environmental damages, we may 
consider the answers as reflecting the individuals’ marginal WTP. Answers may assume 4 values 
(disagree strongly, disagree, agree, strongly agree)
7
. Fig. 2 reports the frequencies registered for 
each answer in the whole sample, while fig.3 reports them by country.  
According to the existing literature, the individual explanatory variables may be grouped in three 
broad categories: 
 
- individual socio-demographic characteristics: age (AGE), age squared (AGE2, introduced in 
order to account for non linear effect), gender (FEMALE), parenthood status (CHILDREN), 
education (EDUCATION);  
 
- individual economic condition: natural log of household income (INCOME) and its squared 
value (INCOME2), introduced to take into account non linear effect; 
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 http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ 
7
 Kollman et al. (2012) employed the same variable as a proxy for voters’ acceptance of environmental taxes. Only this 
paper uses a European dataset, studying the profile of people more willing to pay for the environment. Pirani and 
Secondi (2010) also employs a European dataset, measuring the eco-friendly attitude, but variables on willingness to 
pay have not been taken into account. 
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- personal beliefs and values: political orientation (RIGHT), trust in government 
(GOVER_TRUST), trust in the others (GEN_TRUST), religious belonging (RELIGION), fear 
about environmental catastrophe (ENV_CAT), sense of  belonging to the world as a whole 
(WORLD_WHOLE).  
 
Tab.2 reports codes, detailed description, presentation of the modalities and sources of all these 
variables. 
 
In order to explore the impact of context on individual preferences, we integrated the EVS micro 
data with some country level variables collected from other sources or elaborated by ourselves. A 
part from countries’ dummies (COUNTRY), useful to account for unobserved cross country 
heterogeneity, we include three context variables:  
 
- Environmental Performance Index (EPI) recorded for each country. The index, developed 
by the Yale University, measures country’s environmental performances on a scale that 
ranges between 0 and 100. 
- dummy taking the value of 1 for post USSR countries (EST);  
- dummy taking the value of 1 for countries where an Environmental Fiscal Reform has been 
carried out (REFORM); 
 
These variables are presented and fully described in tab. 2, while descriptive statistic for all the 
employed variables are reported in tab. 3.  After list wise deletion of incomplete cases, our sample 
includes 21,264 observations.  
 
As a preliminary analysis, we carried out an Analysis of Homogeneity of Variance (ANOVA) in order 
to understand if REFORM affects the distribution of the answers related to ENVIRONMENTAL. As 
it is well known, the one-way ANOVA compares the means of a dependent variable between 
groups and determines whether those means are significantly different from each other.  
The significance of the Levene statistics, whose results are reported in tab. 4, gives evidence that 
the basic ANOVA assumption of homogeneity of variance between the groups (REFORM=0 and 
REFORM=1) has been violated; the Brown-Forsythe test and the Welch test (tab. 5) display an 
alternative version of the F statistic (weighting the groups’ variances by the inverse of their sample 
size) and support the applicability of the ANOVA. The ANOVA results (tab. 6) highlight the 
existence of significant differences in the mean values of ENVIRONMENTAL comparing the two 
groups of countries. 
 
5. Methodology 
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Given the discrete and ordered nature of our dependent variable, regression analyses were carried 
out using a categorical dependent variable model. We assume that WTP for preventing 
environmental pollution of individual i is characterized by a continuous latent variable: 

∗ =  +			  [1] 
where  is a vector of individual characteristics, 	 is a random error term and  is the parameter 
to be estimated. While 
∗ cannot be observed, we observe a variable   that takes the values 
from 1 to 4, increasing in individual WTP for environmental interventions. More in detail, we have: 
 = 
		if		 < 
∗ <   for 
 = 1,… , 4  [2] 
 
where κ indicates unknown cut-points to be estimated. The full set of probabilities of the possible 
outcomes is the following : 
 
[	 = 	
|] 	= 	( 	− 	)	− 	( 	− 	) [3]	
	
assuming that κ# = −∞ and κ = +∞ and where F is the cumulative distribution function for the 
error term. This kind of model may be estimated through maximum likelihood. When the 
cumulative distribution function is supposed to be a standard Normal, the ordered probit model 
applies while the Ordered Logit model assumes that the cumulative distribution function is 
logistic.  In this study, we apply the ordered logit estimates that allow computing odds ratios and 
making the interpretation of results clearer. The model applies to data meeting the parallel lines 
assumption (proportional odds, Long and Freese, 2006) that the effect of the independent 
variables do not vary by the level of the dependent variable. 
 
6. Results 
Tab. 7 shows the odds ratios and the standard errors we obtained in three different specifications 
(M1, M2 and M3). All the estimates were also carried out by means of a standard OLS, in order to 
check for multicollinearity
8
 by the variance of inflactor factor (VIF) test. Problems of 
multicollinearity were not detected: a part from squared variables (AGE2 and INCOME2), that 
were included in the specifications in order to account for non linear effects of AGE and INCOME, 
no other variable registered a VIF value higher than 5.  
In the first model (M1) only the individual variables have been included as explanatory . We find 
that females have lower WTP than men (see the results for the FEMALE dummy). Based on our 
                                                           
8
 Results are omitted but available upon request. 
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results, the individual WTP for the environment is significantly affected by the level of 
EDUCATION, as odds ratios for the Middle and Upper education show significant and >1 odds 
ratios.  
Lots of the variables capturing personal beliefs and values turn out to be significant.  RIGHT (WTP 
decreases when people are more right wing oriented but, interestingly, no significant differences 
are found between the extreme left and extreme right orientation), GOVER_TRUST (WTP is higher 
when people show trust in the government), GEN_TRUST (people who trust in the others exhibit 
an higher WTP), WORLD_WHOLE (the odds of having an high WTP for the environment are 63% 
higher for people who perceive themselves as belonging to the world as a whole), ENV_CAT (being 
convinced that an environmental catastrophe is going to happen, leads to significant higher WTP 
for environmental preservation). 
INCOME is found to play a positive and significant role while the non significant odds ratio found 
for INCOME2 does not support the hypothesis of non linear relationship between income and 
WTP for environmental preservation. 
RELIGION also turns out to be determinant: catholic, protestant, orthodox and the residual other 
category all show higher WTP than non religious people. The positive effect seems to be very 
relevant for the orthodox category. 
In the second model (M2) countries dummies have been included. The aim is to account for 
unobserved cross country heterogeneity. The inclusion of countries’ dummies does not affect 
significantly the results we obtained in M1. The only relevant change in the results concerns the 
orthodox category which is not longer significant. Countries dummies show that WTP for the 
environment is significantly higher in Greece (odds ratio=5.52 , Cyprus (4.84), Bulgaria (4.37) and 
Slovenia (3.00) and lower in Germany, Portugal and Finland (the reference category here is 
France).  
In the third model (M3) country dummies are replaced with the set of variables controlling for 
some national characteristics (EPI, EST, REFORM). As individuals within each country are, in fact, 
more similar to one another than individuals from another state, in M3 the assumption that 
observations are independent and identically distributed is violated. For this reason, in order to 
obtain more reliable estimates clustered standard errors have been applied. 
While we do not find any significant effect for EPI, REFORM shows a negative and significant 
impact. The odds of showing a high WTP for environmental preservation are 40% lower for 
respondents who live in a country were an EFR has been set out. A negative but low significant 
effect is also found for the EST dummy. However looking back at the M2, post URSS countries 
show significant and positive effect. Noticeable is the case of Estonia and Czech Republic in witch 
the EFR has been recently applied. 
Results obtained for other variables do not significantly differ from the ones we found in M1 
except for the dummy catholic dummy, for the Middle education dummy, and for INCOME, which 
are not significant anymore.   
10 
 
Two kinds of robustness checks were carried out.  
Firstly, we dichotomized our dependent variable and run again the analyses by the mean of a 
standard logit model, using the same specifications as before. Results are shown in tab. 8 (M4, M5, 
M6) and are very similar to the ones we obtained in with the ordered logit model and our original 
dependent variable. 
Secondly, we replicated model 3 (M3) of tab. 7 by the means of the partial generalized ordered 
logit model.  The generalized ordered logit model (Williams, 2006) may be applied to allow the 
coefficients to vary across categories of the dependent variable when the parallel lines assumption 
of the ordered logit is violated. Looking at the equations [1] and [2], this means that the coefficient 
	 is allowed to differ for each of the categories 
 of the dependent variable.  
In the partial generalized ordered logit model the parallel lines constraint is relaxed only for those 
variables where it is violated; variables whose effects do not significantly differ across equations 
have proportionality constraints imposed, so their coefficient do not vary across categories of the 
dependent variable.  The analysis was run using the autofit option of the gologit2 module provided 
by Williams (2006).  
Results of the partial generalized ordered logit model are shown in tab. 9. Basically, they confirm? 
the ones we obtained in previous models but, at the same time, they help in deepening the 
analysis of the impact of each explanatory variable.  
Looking at tab. 9, the effect of FEMALE varies in both sign and magnitude across the range of WTP 
attitudes. We find that women tend not to take extreme positions: compared with men, they are 
more likely to show an higher WTP than ENVIRONMENTAL = 1 but, at the same time, a lower WTP 
than ENVIRONMENTAL=3. The effect of the political orientation (RIGHT) also varies in magnitude 
across the categories of the dependent variable: right- wing orientation has a negative impact 
especially, but not exclusively, on ENVIRONMENTAL=3. 
The impact of GOVER_TRUST and Upper EDUCATION decreases across the categories of 
ENVIRONMENTAL while the impact of WORLD_WHOLE increases. 
REFORM and EST both meet the parallel lines assumption: their impact does not vary across the 
categories of the dependent variable. 
 
7. The role of knowledge in countries where the environmental fiscal reform (EFR) has been 
set out 
Results presented in the previous sections show that willingness to pay for the environment is 
lower in countries where an environmental fiscal reform has been carried out. According to these 
results, knowledge about the existence of an EFR is presumably crucial: in countries where the EFR 
has been carried out, we expect people being informed about its existence to have a lower willing 
to give part of their income for preventing environmental pollution. 
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We test this hypothesis by considering the effect of knowledge on ENVIRONMENTAL in the 
countries where the EFR has been carried out and in the ones where it has not.  One variable in 
our dataset may be considered as a proxy for knowledge: EDUCATION (more educated people are 
supposed to be more informed).  
In tab. 10 we report the results of regression analyses run on two subsamples: one including all 
the interviews carried out in countries where the EFR has been implemented (REFORM=yes) and a 
second one including all the others (REFORM=no). We use the same specification applied for 
model 3 (M3) in tab. 7 but the variable EST is dropped because no ex communist countries carried 
out an EFR. 
Looking at the results in tab.10, we find that EDUCATION has a positive effect on 
ENVIRONMENTAL in countries where an EFR has not been set out: the more people are educated, 
the higher is their WTP for environmental preservation. The odds of having a high WTP for 
environmental preservation are 17% higher for Middle educated people and 75% higher for 
people having Upper EDUCATION.  
On the contrary, in countries where an EFR has been set out, Middle educated people register 
lower WTP (odds ratio=0.74) while the odds of having a high WTP are only 21% higher for Upper 
educated people.   
These results suggest that, in countries where an EFR has been set out, knowledge about the 
existence of the EFR does seem to have a positive impact on individuals’ WTP for environmental 
preservation.  
 
 
8. Discussion 
The main finding about the relation between the EFR and the WTP for the environment is that the 
latter is lower in countries where these reforms have been carried out. Moreover, further 
investigation on the role of information, which is crucial in understanding the effects of the reform 
(Kollmann et al., 2012; EEA 2011a, Bassi et al., 2009), leads us at stating that people that are 
supposed to be aware about the EFR, considered the proxies used in this study as a measure of 
their knowledge, show a lower WTP. On this argument, Dresner  et al. (2006) explains that 
reactions on the effects of EFR and double dividend can be skeptical, “independent of whether the 
interview partner already knew about the double dividend or had just been introduced to the 
argument” (Ibidem, 2006, p.901).  
The result on the variable “income” can be discussed referring to several empirical studies that do 
not provide a unique explanation. As Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas (2007) state, usually, a positive 
relationship between income and environmental preference to contribute has been found, while 
as in Israel and Levinson (2004) there are predicts that MWTP will increase and then decrease with 
per-capita GDP, with a peak at the point where countries' environments begin improving and 
other that have no prediction about how MWTP will change as per-capita GDP increases (Ibidem 
2004 p.15). We find support for the hypothesis of gender gap in environmental attitude, but 
differently from other studies (see above, par. 2), we do not find that women are more willing to 
pay for the environment, while as generally demonstrated, a high level of education affect 
12 
 
positively the WTP. The negative value of the REFORM variable cannot be explicitly explained by 
the analysis, but looking at the evidence of the facts and at similar studies, we can put our 
attention on three main elements: 1) the time; 2) the perception of the achieved level of 
environmental quality; 3) the weak aspects of the environmental fiscal reform. First it should take 
into consideration the circumstance for which respondents from EFR countries have been 
contributing to the protection of the environment by paying environmental taxes for about 20 
years, at least ten years earlier than some other European countries. The environmental taxation, 
in fact, has a long tradition in Europe, but only recently, and specifically after the Directive 2003 on 
energy product and after the setting of stricter environmental quality targets, by the European 
climate and energy package (20-20-20)
9
, the use of marked based instrument for protect and 
prevent the environment from further damages has became an imperative. This circumstance may 
lead at assuming that people living in EFR countries can be less willing to pay extra money for 
intervention related to the environment. This thought can be supported by the second mentioned 
circumstance for which their marginal utility in achieving additional improving of environmental 
quality may decrease as they perceive that an acceptable level of environmental quality has been 
already achieved, so they are not willing to pay extra money. Studies on the differences in WTP in 
developing and developed countries (Dorsh 2011), for instance, show that respondents from 
higher income countries are no more likely to be willing to pay for further environmental 
preservation. Finally as a number of academic papers state, the EFR system presents some 
weakness, in particular related to the social point of view, in terms of equity and acceptance. 
Moreover, one of the problem related to the EFR is the perception of the shift and the mistrust 
that the revenues can be actually used for improving the quality of the environment (Bassi et al. 
2009). Thus, alternative recycling methods have been investigated.  
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The aim of the paper was to investigate the determinants of willingness to pay for the 
environment in Europe, focusing in particular on the role of Environmental Fiscal Reform. The 
Environmental Fiscal reform represent a complex system of measures aimed at reducing 
environmental externalities by market based instruments. Its general aim is to obtain jointly 
positive effects on employment, innovation and economic growth. Positive results have been 
actually showed by the 6 European countries in which the system has been implemented since the 
early nineties, but social impediments in terms of acceptance for the regressive effect have been 
also largely underlined by empirical researches. These important highlights let us suppose that EFR 
might affect the individual’ preferences in terms of willingness to pay for the environment. In 
order to test it we employed an ordered probit model and analyzed micro data provided by the 
2008-2010 wave of the European Values Survey (EVS). 
As a measure of marginal WTP for the environment we used the following statement: “I would 
give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental 
                                                           
9
 European Commission, COM (2010) 2020, ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’.  
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pollution”.  In order to understand which factors might affect the WTP several explicative variables 
have been included in the model. In particular they encompassed: individual socio-demographic 
characteristics; individual economic condition and personal beliefs and values. Moreover to 
explore the impact of context on individual preferences, we integrated the EVS micro data with 
some country level variables, including Environmental Performance Index, the belonging to post 
USSR countries and the implementation of the environmental fiscal reform. 
Focusing the attention on EFR, results show a negative effect of EFR on individuals’ WTP for the 
environment, while further analysis on the role of information on WTP, show that a negative role 
of individual level of information is found in countries where the EFR has been set out.  
Conscious of the limit of these kind of analysis based on value of judgments that might not reflect 
the real intention of the respondents, as the broad literature has shown, they can be considered a 
likely approximation of the reality and in this specific case, they might have important implication 
in supporting decision making process concerning the implementation of market based 
instruments for internalizing environmental externalities.  
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Fig. 1: Environmental taxes as % of total taxation. Source: Eurostat(2012) 
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Country TAX YEAR EFR
10
 
Denmark 
  
Co2 tax  1992 Tax revenue from income, labour to 
pollution and scarce environmental 
resources. 
Energy package (increase of Co2 tax + 
So2 tax and energy tax on natural gas 
+ on energy used for space heating –
households-) 
1996 Revenues used to reduce employers’ 
social security contributions and 
investment aids for energy saving. 
Tax shifting programmes 1994-2002 A three phases programme involving 
households and industries. Reduction of 
SSC.  
Finland Co2 tax  1990 Reduction of income tax and social 
insurance contributions Landfill tax 1996 
 ETR s 1997 Reduction of labour taxes and increase of 
environmental taxes 
  ETR s 1998   
Germany Mineral oil taxes on transport fuels 1999-2003 Reduction of tax wedge on labour through 
reduced social security contributions for 
both employers and employees.  
Taxes on heavy fuels  2000-2003 
Electricity tax  1999 
  
Heating fuel tax on natural gas and on 
heavy fuel oil  
2004 
The Netherlands Energy regulating tax 1996 Revenue returned to households in terms 
of reduced social security contributions 
Sweden Energy/excise taxed levied on energy 
products 
1991 Reduction in income tax 
 
Co2 taxes  1991   
So2 taxes  1991   
Nox charge  1992 Revenues refunded to power plants 
covered by the charge, in proportion to 
the amount of energy they generate.  
 Green tax shift 2001 -2006 Reduction of income taxes and increase of 
environmental related taxes 
  Fiscal policy programme 2007- 2009 Revision of rates and sectors 
UK 
Transport fuel taxes  1990 Reduction of employers national insurance 
contributions 
Landfill tax 1996 
Climate change Levy 2001 
  Mineral Aggregated taxes  2002   
 
Tab. 1: Environmental Fiscal Reform (EFR) in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK. 
                                                           
10
 Contents of this table have been mainly drawn by: Ashiabor et al. (2005), Andersen and Ekins (2009), Bosquet 
(2000), Ekins and Speack (2011). 
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Code Question/description Modalities Source 
ENVIRONMENTAL I would give part of my income if I were certain that 
the money would be used to prevent environmental 
pollution 
disagree strongly EVS 2008 
 disagree    EVS 2008 
 agree EVS 2008 
  strongly agree EVS 2008 
FEMALE Are you male or female? 0=male EVS 2008 
  1=female EVS 2008 
AGE How old are you? continuous EVS 2008 
AGE2 Age squared continuous EVS 2008 
CHILDREN * Have you had any children? 0=no EVS 2008 
  1=yes EVS 2008 
EDUCATION What is the highest educational level that you have 
attained? 
Lower EVS 2008 
 Middle EVS 2008 
  Upper EVS 2008 
RIGHT In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the 
right." How would you place your views on this scale, 
generally speaking? 
left (reference) EVS 2008 
 2 EVS 2008 
 3 EVS 2008 
  4 EVS 2008 
  5 EVS 2008 
  6 EVS 2008 
  7 EVS 2008 
  8 EVS 2008 
  9 EVS 2008 
  right EVS 2008 
GOVER_TRUST * Could you tell me how much confidence you have in 
the government of your country? 
0= not very much / none at all EVS 2008 
  1= quite a lot/a great deal EVS 2008 
GEN_TRUST * Most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people? 
0=cannot be too careful EVS 2008 
 1= most people can be 
trusted 
EVS 2008 
ENV_CAT * Environment: if things continue we will experience a 
catastrophe 
0= disagree or strongly 
disagree 
EVS 2008 
 1= strongly agree or agree EVS 2008 
RELIGION * Do you belong to a religion or religious 
denomination? If yes, which one? 
roman catholic EVS 2008 
 protestant EVS 2008 
  ortodhox EVS 2008 
  other (free church, buddhist, 
hindu, jew, etc.) 
EVS 2008 
  not religious (reference) EVS 2008 
WORLD_WHOLE Which of these geographical groups would you say 
you belong to first of all? The world as a whole 
0=no EVS 2008 
 1= yes EVS 2008 
INCOME Natural log of monthly household income (x1000), 
corrected for PPP in Euros  
continuous EVS 2008 
INCOME2 INCOME  squared continuous EVS 2008 
EST Dummy for post USSR countries continuous Own elaboration 
EPI Environmental Performance Index (Historical EPI)  continuous Yale  Center for 
Environmental Law 
and Policy (YCELP) 
REFORM Dummy =1 for countries were EFR was carried out 0=no; 1=yes own elaboration 
COUNTRY Countries' dummies One dummy for each country: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France (reference), Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom (UK) 
EVS 2008 
Tab. 2: codes, detailed description, presentation of the modalities and sources of all the variables. * indicates variables which 
have been recoded from the original EVS database. Reference categories in italic bold 
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 Variable  Modalities Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Variable Modalities Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FEMALE 21264 0.52 0.50 0 1 COUNTRY Austria 21264 0.04 0.20 0 1 
AGE 21264 48.94 17.25 16 108 Belgium 21264 0.06 0.23 0 1 
AGE2 21264 2692.45 1754.62 256 11664 Bulgaria 21264 0.03 0.18 0 1 
CHILDREN 21264 0.73 0.44 0 1  Cyprus 21264 0.02 0.15 0 1 
EDUCATION Lower 
21264 0.29 0.45 0 1 
 Czech 
Republic 21264 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 Middle 21264 0.46 0.50 0 1  Denmark 21264 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Upper 21264 0.26 0.44 0 1  Estonia 21264 0.04 0.20 0 1 
RIGHT left 21264 0.05 0.22 0 1  Finland 21264 0.03 0.18 0 1 
 2 21264 0.04 0.20 0 1  France 21264 0.06 0.23 0 1 
3 21264 0.10 0.30 0 1  Germany 21264 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 4 21264 0.10 0.30 0 1  Greece 21264 0.05 0.21 0 1 
 5 21264 0.31 0.46 0 1  Hungary 21264 0.05 0.23 0 1 
 6 21264 0.13 0.34 0 1  Ireland 21264 0.01 0.12 0 1 
 7 21264 0.10 0.30 0 1  Italy 21264 0.03 0.17 0 1 
 8 21264 0.09 0.29 0 1  Latvia 21264 0.04 0.19 0 1 
 9 21264 0.03 0.17 0 1  Lithuania 21264 0.02 0.15 0 1 
 right 21264 0.05 0.21 0 1  Luxemburg 21264 0.04 0.20 0 1 
GOVER_TRUST 21264 0.35 0.48 0 1  Malta 21264 0.02 0.14 0 1 
GEN_TRUST 21264 1.36 0.48 1 2  Netherlands 21264 0.05 0.22 0 1 
ENV_CAT 21264 0.81 0.39 0 1  Poland 21264 0.03 0.18 0 1 
RELIGION roman catholic 21264 0.37 0.48 0 1  Portugal 21264 0.02 0.14 0 1 
protestant 21264 0.15 0.36 0 1  Romania 21264 0.02 0.16 0 1 
 ortodhox 
21264 0.13 0.34 0 1 
 Slovak 
Republic 21264 0.03 0.18 0 1 
not religious 21264 0.31 0.46 0 1  Slovenia 21264 0.03 0.17 0 1 
 other  21264 0.04 0.19 0 1 Spain 21264 0.03 0.18 0 1 
WORLD_WHOLE 21264 0.05 0.22 0 1 Sweden 21264 0.03 0.17 0 1 
INCOME 21264 0.16 0.86 -2.99 2.69 UK 21264 0.04 0.20 0 1 
INCOME2 21264 0.76 1.11 0.00 8.94 
EST 21264 0.32 0.47 0 1 
EPI 21264 63.19 5.70 47.7 70.2 
REFORM   21264 0.26 0.44 0 1               
Tab. 3: Descriptive statistics 
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Fig. 2: Willingness to pay for environmental preservation (ENVIRONMENTAL). Whole sample.  
Source: Own elaboration on EVS data after listwise deletion of incomplete cases. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Willingness to pay for environmental preservation (ENVIRONMENTAL) by country. Source: Own elaboration on EVS data 
after listwise deletion of incomplete cases. 
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Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
14.323 1 21262 .000 
Tab. 4: Test of homogeneity of variances. The dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTAL while the factor is REFORM. 
 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch 109.674 1 9690.082 .000 
Brown-Forsythe 109.674 1 9690.082 .000 
Tab. 5: Robust test of equality of means. The dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTAL while the factor is REFORM. 
 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 83.652 1 83.652 109.595 .000 
Within Groups 16228.894 21262 .763 
  
Total 16312.546 21263 
   
Tab. 6: ANOVA statistics. The dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTAL while the factor is REFORM. 
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    M1 M2 M3
a
 
FEMALE 0.94** (0.02) 0.94** (0.02) 0.93*   (0.03)    
AGE 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00    (0.01)    
AGE2 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00    (0.00)    
CHILDREN 1.01 (0.04) 0.99 (0.04) 1.02    (0.05)    
EDUCATION Middle 1.07** (0.03) 1.21*** (0.04) 1.11    (0.08)    
 Upper 1.50*** (0.06) 1.72*** (0.07) 1.57*** (0.12)    
RIGHT 2 0.97 (0.08) 1.09 (0.10) 1.01    (0.11)    
 3 0.88* (0.06) 0.99 (0.07) 0.92    (0.09)    
4 0.78*** (0.06) 0.89 (0.07) 0.83    (0.10)    
 5 0.75*** (0.05) 0.83*** (0.05) 0.78*** (0.07)    
 6 0.74*** (0.05) 0.84** (0.06) 0.79*   (0.10)    
 7 0.76*** (0.06) 0.84** (0.06) 0.82*   (0.09)    
 8 0.73*** (0.05) 0.80*** (0.06) 0.78**  (0.09)    
 9 0.76*** (0.07) 0.83** (0.08) 0.79    (0.13)    
 right 0.97 (0.08) 1.01 (0.09) 1.01    (0.16)    
GEN_TRUST 1.27*** (0.04) 1.29*** (0.04) 1.34*** (0.08)    
RELIGION roman 
catholic 1.12*** (0.04) 1.09** (0.04) 0.99    (0.07)    
protestant 1.13*** (0.05) 1.20*** (0.06) 1.38*   (0.25)    
ortodhox 2.78*** (0.12) 0.96 (0.07) 2.38*** (0.37)    
other  1.33*** (0.09) 1.21** (0.09) 1.32**  (0.18)    
ENV_CAT 1.99*** (0.07) 1.97*** (0.07) 1.90*** (0.14)    
GOVER_TRUST 1.36*** (0.04) 1.25*** (0.04) 1.35*** (0.08)    
WORLD_WHOLE 1.63*** (0.10) 1.65*** (0.10) 1.58*** (0.10)    
INCOME 1.08*** (0.02) 1.06*** (0.02) 1.07    (0.05)    
INCOME2 1.01 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 1.00    (0.03)    
COUNTRY Austria 0.88 (0.08)               
Belgium 1.27*** (0.10)               
Bulgaria 4.37*** (0.47)               
Cyprus 4.84*** (0.62)               
Czech 
Republic 1.37*** (0.12)               
Denmark 2.20*** (0.21)               
Estonia 1.34*** (0.11)               
Finland 0.52*** (0.05)               
Germany 0.49*** (0.04)               
Greece 5.52*** (0.61)               
Hungary 0.99 (0.08)               
Ireland 1.32** (0.16)               
Italy 2.27*** (0.21)               
Latvia 1.88*** (0.17)               
Lithuania 0.87 (0.09)               
Luxemburg 2.08*** (0.18)               
Malta 2.36*** (0.26)               
Netherlands 1.26*** (0.10)               
Poland 0.92 (0.08)               
Portugal 0.80** (0.09)               
Romania 2.68*** (0.34)               
Slovak 
Republic 1.15 (0.11)               
Slovenia 3.00*** (0.28)               
Spain 1.30*** (0.12)               
Sweden 1.35*** (0.13)               
UK 1.08 (0.09)               
EPI 0.99    (0.01)    
EST 0.79*   (0.11)    
REFORM           0.60**  (0.15)    
Obs. 21264 21264 21264    
log likelihood -25604.71 -24969.23 -25511.65    
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.05 0.03    
LR chi2 1620.93 2891.89 .    
PR>chi2 0.00 0.00 .    
BIC   51488.44 50476.56 51282.38    
Tab. 7: Ordered logit estimates. The dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTAL. Odds ratios and standard errors (in parentheses). 
*,**,*** mean significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 significance level.  a= clustered standard errors applied
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    M4 M5 M6
a
 
FEMALE 0.94** (0.03) 0.94**  (0.03)    0.93**  (0.03)    
AGE 0.99 (0.01) 1.00    (0.01)    1.00    (0.01)    
AGE2 1.00 (0.00) 1.00    (0.00)    1.00    (0.00)    
CHILDREN 1.01 (0.04) 0.98    (0.04)    1.01    (0.06)    
EDUCATION Middle 1.09** (0.04) 1.23*** (0.05)    1.12    (0.08)    
 Upper 1.63*** (0.07) 1.88*** (0.09)    1.70*** (0.14)    
RIGHT 2 1.01 (0.10) 1.12    (0.12)    1.04    (0.10)    
 3 0.92 (0.08) 1.04    (0.09)    0.97    (0.09)    
4 0.86* (0.07) 0.99    (0.09)    0.92    (0.10)    
 5 0.76*** (0.06) 0.83**  (0.06)    0.79*** (0.07)    
 6 0.76*** (0.06) 0.87*   (0.07)    0.82    (0.10)    
 7 0.82** (0.07) 0.90    (0.08)    0.88    (0.10)    
 8 0.78*** (0.07) 0.85*   (0.07)    0.82*   (0.09)    
 9 0.76*** (0.08) 0.82*   (0.09)    0.79    (0.13)    
 right 0.96 (0.09) 1.01    (0.10)    1.00    (0.14)    
GEN_TRUST 1.28*** (0.04) 1.32*** (0.05)    1.36*** (0.09)    
RELIGION roman 
catholic 1.10*** (0.04) 1.06    (0.04)    0.96    (0.07)    
protestant 1.09* (0.05) 1.23*** (0.07)    1.37    (0.26)    
ortodhox 2.62*** (0.14) 0.96    (0.09)    2.26*** (0.41)    
other  1.33*** (0.11) 1.20**  (0.10)    1.33**  (0.19)    
ENV_CAT 2.10*** (0.08) 2.09*** (0.08)    2.01*** (0.16)    
GOVER_TRUST 1.45*** (0.05) 1.33*** (0.04)    1.44*** (0.09)    
WORLD_WHOLE 1.64*** (0.12) 1.65*** (0.12)    1.58*** (0.14)    
INCOME 1.08*** (0.02) 1.06*** (0.02)    1.07    (0.05)    
INCOME2 1.00 (0.01) 1.00    (0.01)    1.00    (0.03)    
COUNTRY Austria 0.88    (0.08)                  
Belgium 1.37*** (0.12)                  
Bulgaria 5.35*** (0.74)                  
Cyprus 4.77*** (0.80)                  
Czech 
Republic 1.35*** (0.13)                  
Denmark 1.98*** (0.22)                  
Estonia 1.37*** (0.13)                  
Finland 0.48*** (0.05)                  
Germany 0.48*** (0.04)                  
Greece 5.03*** (0.69)                  
Hungary 0.92    (0.08)                  
Ireland 1.29*   (0.17)                  
Italy 2.53*** (0.28)                  
Latvia 1.93*** (0.20)                  
Lithuania 0.88    (0.10)                  
Luxemburg 1.92*** (0.19)                  
Malta 2.23*** (0.29)                  
Netherlands 1.27*** (0.11)                  
Poland 0.92    (0.09)                  
Portugal 0.76**  (0.09)                  
Romania 2.10*** (0.30)                  
Slovak 
Republic 1.32*** (0.13)    
Slovenia 5.11*** (0.68)    
Spain 1.39*** (0.14)    
Sweden 1.16    (0.13)    
UK 1.02    (0.10)    
EPI 1.00    (0.01)    
EST 0.80    (0.12)    
REFORM           0.55**  (0.14)    
Obs. 21264 21264 21264    
log likelihood -13485.64 -13028.34 -13396.25    
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.08 0.05    
LR chi2 1379.71 2294.31 .    
PR>chi2 0.00 0.00 .    
BIC   27230.36   26525.02   27051.58    
Tab. 8: Ordered logit estimates. The dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTAL recoded into two categories. Odds ratios and 
standard errors (in parentheses). *,**,*** mean significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 significance level.  a= 
clustered standard errors applied
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    ENVIRONMENTAL=1 ENVIRONMENTAL=2 ENVIRONMENTAL=3 
FEMALE 0.12*** (0.04)    -0.07*   (0.04)    -0.18*** (0.04)    
AGE 0.00    (0.01)    0.00    (0.01)    0.00    (0.01)    
AGE2 -0.00    (0.00)    -0.00    (0.00)    -0.00    (0.00)    
CHILDREN 0.02    (0.05)    0.02    (0.05)    0.02    (0.05)    
EDUCATION Middle 0.11    (0.07)    0.11    (0.07)    0.11    (0.07)    
 Upper 0.54*** (0.11)    0.52*** (0.08)    0.31*** (0.08)    
RIGHT 2 0.01    (0.11)    0.01    (0.11)    0.01    (0.11)    
 3 -0.07    (0.10)    -0.07    (0.10)    -0.07    (0.10)    
4 -0.10    (0.12)    -0.13    (0.12)    -0.33**  (0.13)    
 5 -0.07    (0.10)    -0.27*** (0.09)    -0.27*** (0.09)    
 6 0.04    (0.14)    -0.24*   (0.13)    -0.38*** (0.14)    
 7 -0.00    (0.14)    -0.16    (0.12)    -0.37*** (0.09)    
 8 -0.24**  (0.11)    -0.24**  (0.11)    -0.24**  (0.11)    
 9 -0.21    (0.17)    -0.29*   (0.17)    -0.06    (0.18)    
 right -0.25    (0.17)    -0.06    (0.14)    0.21    (0.15)    
GEN_TRUST 0.41*** (0.07)    0.29*** (0.06)    0.23*** (0.08)    
RELIGION roman 
catholic -0.01    (0.07)    -0.01    (0.07)    -0.01    (0.07)    
protestant 0.32*   (0.19)    0.32*   (0.19)    0.32*   (0.19)    
ortodhox 0.84*** (0.15)    0.84*** (0.15)    0.84*** (0.15)    
other  0.27**  (0.13)    0.27**  (0.13)    0.27**  (0.13)    
ENV_CAT 0.65*** (0.07)    0.65*** (0.07)    0.65*** (0.07)    
GOVER_TRUST 0.41*** (0.08)    0.36*** (0.06)    0.12*   (0.06)    
WORLD_WHOLE 0.14**  (0.07)    0.46*** (0.09)    0.52*** (0.09)    
INCOME 0.07    (0.05)    0.07    (0.05)    0.07    (0.05)    
INCOME2 0.01    (0.03)    0.01    (0.03)    0.01    (0.03)    
EPI -0.01    (0.01)    -0.01    (0.01)    -0.01    (0.01)    
EST -0.23*   (0.14)    -0.23*   (0.14)    -0.23*   (0.14)    
REFORM   -0.52**  (0.26)    -0.52**  (0.26)    -0.52**  (0.26)    
Obs. 21264    
log likelihood -25409.77    
Pseudo R2 0.04    
LR chi2 973.89    
PR>chi2 0.00    
BIC   51078.63    
Tab. 9: Generalized ordered logit (GOLOGIT) estimates with the parallel lines constraint relaxed only for those variables where it 
is violated (partial proportional odds model). The dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTAL. Coefficients and standard errors 
corrected for clustering at country level in parentheses. *,**,*** mean significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
significance level.
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    REFORM=YES REFORM=NO 
FEMALE 0.94    (0.09)    0.93**  (0.03)    
AGE 0.99    (0.02)    1.00    (0.01)    
AGE2 1.00    (0.00)    1.00    (0.00)    
CHILDREN 1.01    (0.07)    0.97    (0.07)    
EDUCATION Middle 0.74*** (0.08)    1.17**  (0.09)    
 Upper 1.21**  (0.11)    1.75*** (0.20)    
RIGHT 2 1.13    (0.20)    0.98    (0.09)    
 3 0.97    (0.20)    0.94    (0.09)    
4 0.91    (0.19)    0.86    (0.11)    
 5 0.76    (0.17)    0.76*** (0.07)    
 6 0.67    (0.18)    0.81    (0.11)    
 7 0.67    (0.17)    0.90    (0.11)    
 8 0.55**  (0.13)    0.89    (0.11)    
 9 0.44**  (0.14)    0.88    (0.14)    
 right 0.56*   (0.18)    1.06    (0.14)    
GEN_TRUST 1.77*** (0.12)    1.19*** (0.08)    
RELIGION roman catholic 1.26    (0.21)    0.96    (0.09)    
protestant 1.38    (0.30)    1.34*   (0.21)    
ortodhox 0.38*** (0.12)    2.33*** (0.48)    
other  1.42**  (0.24)    1.36*   (0.25)    
ENV_CAT 1.86*** (0.26)    2.19*** (0.19)    
GOVER_TRUST 1.56*** (0.18)    1.45*** (0.11)    
WORLD_WHOLE 1.66*** (0.22)    1.62*** (0.17)    
INCOME 1.14    (0.10)    1.12    (0.08)    
INCOME2 1.04    (0.04)    1.00    (0.03)    
EPI   0.95    (0.09)    1.00    (0.01)    
Obs. 5532    15732    
log likelihood -3543.84    -9786.68    
Pseudo R2 0.07    0.05    
LR chi2 .    .    
PR>chi2 .    .    
BIC   7130.76    19766.64    
Tab. 10: Ordered logit estimates. The dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTAL. Odds ratios and  standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at country level (in parentheses). *,**,*** mean significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 significance 
level. 
